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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [MNUC](#) [KNNP](#) [FR](#)
SUBJECT: NPT REVCON: FRENCH MFA ON MANAGING THE NAM AND
U.S. NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

REF: STATE 128744

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Kathy Allegrone, Reasons 1.
4(b), (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: During a December 23 meeting, MFA Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) officer Celine Jurgensen presented the latest French thinking on managing challenges from Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) countries in the run up to the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). She also expressed concern about the possibility that the United States might adopt a "sole purpose" policy or other significant doctrinal changes in the Nuclear Posture Review that could have repercussions for France at the RevCon. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) Jurgensen said that the MFA has not yet formulated a response to the U.S. non-paper on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) withdrawal provision provided in reftel, but planned to have feedback prior to the January 13 P3/P5 meetings in Geneva. However, she suggested that the United States share the non-paper with other key EU member states, especially Spain, which will assume the EU presidency for the first half of 2010, but also Germany, and the Netherlands, adding that the EU created similar proposals on the subject in 2005 and 2007 and could be a useful partner if engaged.

¶3. (C) Following on the most recent P3 consultations at Wilton Park in mid-December, Jurgensen said France was working on a non-paper promoting the Additional Protocol. The MFA is currently translating the non-paper into English, which Post will provide to the Department when available. Jurgensen gave poloff the French version, which stresses the link between the assurances provided by the Additional Protocol and the right to a nuclear program for peaceful use. Jurgensen suggested that France, the UK, and the United States divide between them a list of key NAM states to whom they could deliver a similar demarche, with France focusing on Francophone nations.

¶4. (C) Additionally, the French mission in Vienna is developing ideas on how to strengthen IAEA safeguards more generally, which the French will share with the P3 soon. Jurgensen said that the P3 could use these ideas to create a unified working paper as a basis to bring in the EU and other like-minded states and approach the RevCon with a broad and coherent consensus on nonproliferation and IAEA safeguards.

¶5. (C/NF) Jurgensen also expressed France's concerns about letters the NAM has sent to the IAEA and the CTBTO criticizing UNSCR 1887, the resolution approved unanimously at the UNSC Nuclear Summit hosted by President Obama in September. According to Jurgensen, the Egyptian ambassador to the IAEA has indicated to the French that, as NAM chair, Egypt is preparing a similar letter to the UN Secretary General or the president of the Security Council. Jurgensen said that if P3 missions in New York worked together to target a small number of moderate NAM missions, this would be enough to discourage such a letter. She opined that

splitting the NAM on this issue should not be difficult, since the heads of state of three NAM members of the Security Council - Costa Rica, Vietnam, and Burkina Faso - had voted in favor of UNSCR 1887 in September. Jurgensen said the GOF believes that Iran is the driving force behind the letter campaign, and that NAM chair Egypt is doing the bidding of the Iranians. In fact, Egypt's greatest danger at the 2010 RevCon is that it will provide cover for Iran. In this context, the GOF would be very interested in hearing an update on U.S. efforts to encourage more constructive Egyptian behavior at the RevCon.

¶16. (C) Jurgensen said that a recent report by the International Commission on Nonproliferation and Disarmament had advocated a "sole purpose" doctrine, according to which nuclear weapons states would declare that their arsenals are designed only to deter other nuclear weapons states. Jurgensen said in the wake of statements by U.S. officials on the need to decrease the importance of nuclear weapons as an element of military strategy, some in the GOF had expressed concern that the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review might incorporate a "sole purpose" or a "no first use" doctrine. This would contradict with French doctrine, which holds that the French arsenal is meant to deter strategic threats from all actors, and could provoke NAM pressure at the RevCon for further doctrinal changes from the P5.

¶17. (C/NF) COMMENT: France's "offensive" priority in preparing for the RevCon is to work with the P3 to encourage NAM flexibility on nonproliferation. Jurgensen's comments underscore that, for France, Iran is the true litmus test of the utility of the NPT in deterring or preventing nuclear

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proliferation, and the GOF will insist on a mention of Iran (and North Korea) in any final document. As always, France's "defensive" priority is to avoid any pressure to disarm further or modify its nuclear doctrine. Clearly, the GOF is leaving no stone unturned in its analysis of U.S. policy in an attempt to determine to what extent we might threaten this particular red-line. END COMMENT.
RIVKIN